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Abstract
Two perspectives have dominated the discourse on the causes of the financial crisis of
2008. The first attributes the financial crisis to intentionally malevolent behaviors, whereas the
second attributes it to the natural market fluctuations. However, there is still a third, possible
perspective. While the first two perspectives focus on the intention of the actors, the third
perspective focuses on the response of the observers. This is what Vaughan (1996) refers to as
“normalization of deviance”. In normalization of deviance actions or decisions that are initially
regarded as aberrant or atypical are re-conceptualized and adopted as the new criterion. The aim
of the present study was to examine the relationship between normalization of deviance, the dark
triad and risk-taking behavior. The dependent variable was the amount of money invested.
Participants were 171 students from the University of Texas at El Paso between the ages of 18
and 51 years. The data were analyzed using a repeated measures Multi-level Modeling
framework. The first hypothesis stated that normalization of deviance would predict risk-taking
such that the participants in the normalization of deviance condition would invest significantly
greater amounts of money than those in the no-normalization of deviance condition. This
hypothesis was not supported. The second hypothesis stated that there would be significant
interaction between normalization of deviance and the Dark Triad. This hypothesis was not
supported. Exploratory analysis revealed that prior loans was a significant predictor. Although
the hypotheses were not supported, the current study contributed to the existing literature in three
ways. Firstly, the study examined the construct of normalization of deviance in the new context
of financial decisions. Second we developed a new paradigm to examine the construct. Lastly, a
more robust statistical model was used to analyze the data.
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Introduction

"I had a sick feeling in my stomach. I knew what financial crises felt like, and they felt like this."
- Timothy Geithner, former President & CEO NY Fed,
Stress Test (2014), pp. 117.
As a result of the financial crisis of 2008, in the twelve months between 2008 and 2009,
U.S. families lost about 17 trillion dollars in wealth, two and half million families filed for
bankruptcy and about 8.3 million people lost their jobs. In the following twelve months, between
2009 and 2010, about 300 banks filed for bankruptcy (Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 2011;
American Bankruptcy Institute (n.d); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (n.d.).
Two perspectives have dominated the discourse on the causes of the financial crisis. The
first attributes the financial crisis to intentionally malevolent behaviors, whereas the second
attributes it to the natural market fluctuations. According to the first perspective, it was the
avarice of the bankers, unscrupulousness of the politicians and dereliction of duty by the
regulators that led to the financial crisis. They argue that bankers recklessly gambled with
people’s life-savings, pocketed the profits and left the taxpayers to foot the losses. Politicians
colluded with banks to remove the legal safeguards that protected ordinary citizens. Regulators
turned a blind eye to the reckless risk-taking by banks and failed to reign in Wall Street greed.
(Greenwald, 2011; Johnson & Kwak, 2011; Taibbi, 2014).
The second perspective dismisses the notion that intentionally malevolent behavior was
the cause of the financial crisis in 2008. Instead, individuals subscribing to this perspective
argue that financial booms and busts are normal in a free market economy (Geithner, 2014).
They cite the examples of the Dutch Tulip boom & bust of 1636, the South Sea boom & bust of
1

1720 and more recently the tech boom & bust of late 1990s. According to them there was
nothing intentionally malevolent about the behavior; it has happened in the past and it will
continue to happen in the future (Foote, Gerardi & Willen, 2012; Mckay, 2011; Nocera, 2011).
However, there is still a third, possible perspective. While the first two perspectives focus
on the intention of the actors, the third perspective focuses on the response of the observers. This
is what Vaughan (1996) refers to as “normalization of deviance”. In normalization of deviance
actions or decisions that are initially regarded as aberrant or atypical over time are reconceptualized and adopted as the new criterion. She describes the normalization of deviance as
a five step process as follows:
1. Indication of possible risk
2. Recognition of increased risk
3. Re-assessment of risk
4. Adoption of increased risk as new criterion
5. Implementation of decision
Normalization of deviance has been speculated to play a role in a wide variety of
engineering problems and repeated failures to address those problems. One example comes from
the Ford Motor Company’s failure to properly position the Ford Pinto’s gas tank which made the
Pinto prone to catching fire upon collision. Documents revealed by newspaper exposés starting
from 1976 as well as in the course of the criminal trial showed how the managers and executives
knew of the hazard but repeatedly failed to recall the dangerous vehicle. The indication that the
placement of fuel tank might be a problem came from tests carried out on two other models – a
Toyota and a Capri. These cars were remodeled such that the fuel tank was situated behind the
rear axle to resemble Pinto’s design. When these cars were driven into an obstacle, like a wall,
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at 20 mph during testing, the fuel tank cracked. The cars started dripping gasoline and
consequently failing the test. However, the Pinto itself was not crash tested before been sold to
customers. Later when the company did crash test the Pinto, it failed the test. The fact that the
Pinto was failing crash test was a clear sign of increased risk. The Ford executives deliberated on
how they could ameliorate the problem. However, they eventually reassessed the risk as not
being grave enough to warrant immediate changes in the design. They decided to wait until
stricter standards were imposed by National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. In the
meantime, the company decided to go ahead with producing more Pintos and selling them to
customers (Cullen, Cavender, Maakestad & Benson, 2006).
Dennis Gioia (1992), who served as one of the Ford employees responsible for recall
decisions during part of the Pinto crisis in an article discusses his own lack of struggle with the
decision not to recall the Pinto. This first-hand account of the decision-making process at Ford
bears a close resemblance to the five step process outlined by Vaughan (1996).
[Indication of Possible risk]
“One of these new files concerned reports of Pintos “lighting up” (in the
words of a field representative) in rear-end accidents…Was there a
problem? Not as far as I was concerned… I do, however, remember being
disquieted by a field report accompanied by graphic, detailed photos of the
remains of a burned out Pinto in which several people had died. Although
that report became part of my file, I did not flag it as any special case.”
(pp.381-382)
[Recognition of Increased risk]
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“…, I later saw a crumpled, burned car at a Ford depot where alleged
problem components and vehicles were delivered for inspection and
analysis…The revulsion on seeing this incinerated hulk was immediate
and profound. Soon afterwards, and despite the fact that the file was very
sparse, I recommended the Pinto case for preliminary department review
concerning possible recall.” (pp.382)
[Reassessment of Risk]
“After the usual round of discussion about criteria and justification for
recall, everyone voted against recommending recall – including me. It did
not fit the pattern of recallable standards; the evidence was not
overwhelming that the car was defective in some way, so the case was
actually fairly straightforward.” (pp.382)
Dennis Gioia later in the article recollects how the employees at Ford genuinely did not
think that the Pinto was an unsafe car. In fact, at least three of them drove a Pinto or had bought
one for their family member, including the author.
In both these cases, the problem unfolded over time, the employees were aware of the
problem, yet were unable or unwilling to see the seriousness of the problem and therefore failed
to do something about it. Thus it seems clear that the deviant acts of the organization were
normalized in the minds of both the leaders and the employees.
Evidence for the existence of the construct of Normalization of Deviance comes from a
series of laboratory studies conducted by Dillon and Tinsley (2008). In one of their study 46
participants comprising of NASA employees and undergraduate engineering students were asked
to maneuver a spacecraft on Mars through inclement weather. They were told that this craft
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which was on an 11 day mission on Mars had been maneuvered by the computer for the first five
days. On day six the study participants were asked to take charge of the spacecraft. They were
given periodic weather forecasts since driving the craft in bad weather could lead to irreparable
wheel damage two out of five times. Any damage to the wheels would end the mission
immediately.
At this point half the participants were informed that thrice in the first five days the
spacecraft had faced and driven through inclement weather. The other half of the participants
were told that in the first five days the craft had faced and driven through favorable weather. For
Day 6 they were told the weather department had forecasted violent storms. The participants
were faced with the dilemma of whether to drive on and risk damaging the wheels or stay put
and protect the wheels. The researchers found that those participants who were told that the
spacecraft had driven through previous storms were significantly more likely to risk driving on
than those without such information. In other words, for the experimental group the risky
decision to drive through bad weather was reassessed in the light of the information that the craft
had driven through previous storms. For them driving through violent storms became normalized
and therefore the apparent choice when faced with the dilemma. On the other hand, for the
control group the decision to drive through a storm was and continued to be an atypical or
aberrant choice and therefore avoided.
Could normalization of deviance have played a role in the financial crisis of 2008? Some
anecdotal evidence suggests that this indeed may have been the case. In his book Stress Test
(2014) the then President & CEO of the New York Fed Timothy Geithner narrates an incident
that follows the same five step decision-making pattern explicated by Vaughan (1996).
[Indication of Possible Risk & Recognition of Increased Risk]
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“That concern grew when our gradual increases in the short-term
federal funds rate failed to boost long-term interest rates, a
situation Greenspan dubbed the “conundrum”…The Fed wasn’t
fueling the credit boom with loose policy anymore – we raised
rates to 5.25 by 2006 well above the underlying inflation rate – but
there was still an awful lot of money sloshing around.” (pp. 109)
[Re-assessment of Risk]
“We spent a lot of time back then trying to figure out how far the
credit and housing booms were going to go and how they might
end. A lot of internal Fed work and academic studies suggested
that the run-up in home prices was justified by economic
fundamentals and that in any case sharp nationwide price drops
had little historical precedent. …Fed economists projected that
even if there were a 20 percent nationwide decline in housing
prices, it would cause only about half the economic damage of the
bursting of the dot-com bubble.” (pp. 109-110)

[Adoption of increased risk as the new standard & Implementation of decision]
“…I had seen in Japan and Thailand how lavishly financed real
estate booms can end in tears. But I took much comfort in analyses
downplaying the risk of large nationwide declines, which hadn’t
happened in the United States since the Depression.” … “We
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believe that, absent some large, negative shock to perceptions…the
effects of the expected cooling in housing prices are going to be
modest,” I said during a rate-setting meeting in 2006.” (pp. 110)
What psychological processes might be playing a role in Normalization of Deviance? In
other words, why did people agree to assume increasing risk? Both individual and group level
processes might be playing a role here. Individual level processes help us determine whether to
term an object, event or course of action as risky. However, according to Slovic (1997) “risk is
inherently subjective,” which means that some degree of bias invariably creeps in at various
junctures during the risk assessment process. Additionally, according to Slovic (1997) risk is
“socially constructed,” which means that risk is conceptualized in collaboration with other
members of the group. Hence, group level processes are also involved in our decision to term
something risky. Thus, it is both individual and group level processes that i) encourage risktaking, and ii) discourage risk aversion.
Individual Level Processes
Bounded Rationality: According to Simons (1991) who proposed the theory of bounded
rationality, the efficacy of human decision-making is often compromised by the cognitive
limitations of the human brain. These cognitive limitations constrain both the quantity and
quality of possible options that an individual can generate and/or foresee. The individual tries to
cope with these limitations in two ways, either through “approximate optimization” or through
“satisficing.” An individual faced with a sophisticated problem is said to engage in approximate
optimization when he/she concedes some of the complexity of the problem but generates the
closest-ideal solution. On the other hand an individual is said to engage in satisficing when
he/she is able to preserve the complexity of the problem but generates a solution that is merely
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passable. In sum, our limited cognitive capacities force us to compromise on either the quality of
the problem or the quality of solution.
How do our limited cognitive capacities play a role in normalization of deviance and
induce increased risk-taking? Our limited capacities force us to rely on “heuristics and biases” in
judgment and decision making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Specifically relevant to
normalization of deviance are:
1. Outcome Bias: According to Baron and Hershey (1988) outcome bias refers to the
tendency to value the outcome of a decision in a manner that is extraneous to the efficacy
of the decision. Empirical evidence for outcome bias comes from one of the experiments
carried out by Dillon and Tinsley (2008). In their study participants read about a manager
who decided to forego equipment inspection before the launch of a satellite. Three groups
read three different outcomes of this decision. The first group read a scenario where the
launch was an outright success i.e. there were no glitches after the decision was made
leading to a favorable outcome. The second group read a scenario where the launch was a
fortuitous success i.e. although there were glitches after the decision was made luck was
the main factor in leading to a favorable outcome. The third group read a scenario where
the launch was a complete failure i.e. there were glitches after the decision was made
leading to an unfavorable outcome. Post hoc tests revealed that while participants clearly
distinguished between failure and success, they made no significant distinction between
fortuitous success and outright success.
Outcome bias might be one of the reasons why large part of the financial industry
failed to see how deviant their behavior was. Before the financial crises, the banking
industry took numerous ill-considered risks. However, they did not suffer many negative
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consequences of their risky decisions and in some cases even earned profits. They
interpreted these successes to mean that the behavior was not deviant and continued to
taking increasing risks.
2. Naïve optimism – According to Weinstein (1980), naïve optimism or “unrealistic
optimism” refers to the conviction often held by people that there is a greater probability
of good incidents happening to them and lesser probability of bad incidents happening to
them. Weinstein asked 1,258 students to the rate the probability of encountering 18
positive and 24 negative incidents in their life. He found that students rated the likelihood
of encountering positive incidents as significantly higher than average and encountering
negative incidents as significantly lower than average.
In a study by Yang, Markoczy and Qi (2007) the researchers correlated
participants’ score on naïve optimism with their choice of credit card. They found that
participants who scored higher on naïve optimism often opted for credit cards with a
higher APR than was advantageous to them since they were overly optimistic about how
often they paid back on time the credit card debt they had acquired. Another example of
unrealistic optimism comes from the financial markets during early 2000. At that time
there was a strongly held belief by many in the financial market that the housing prices
will continue to increase. Some were projecting increases in housing prices from
anywhere between 2% and 11%. In reality, for nearly a 100 years from late 1900s to early
2000 US housing prices had increased at the rate of 1% annually. By those standards
projecting such a drastic increase in housing prices was incredibly optimistic (as cited in
Foote, Gerardi & Willen, 2012). Thus naïve optimism might have worked in two ways in
the financial sector. One, the banks were extremely optimistic that the housing market
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would keep growing and two, even if they took on large amounts of debt they would be
able to pay it back.
A related concept is the ‘law of increasing optimism’ given by Landau and
Chisholm (1995) wherein the greater the time lapse since the previous crisis the greater is
the conviction that a new one will not come to pass. For example, it had been
approximately 70 years since the Depression. With each passing year people felt more
optimistic that another Great Depression would not occur. Hence, starting from 1986
onwards the safeguards put in place after the Depression were systematically removed
(Geithner, 2014; Johnson & Kwak, 2011).
3. Risk as emotion – This “risk as feeling" perspective was proposed by Loewenstein,
Weber, Hsee & Welch (2001). According to this perspective, while determining the
riskiness of a course of action emotional evaluations at times conflict with cognitive
judgments. When such a conflict arises, it is often emotional evaluations that propel
behavior. Empirical evidence for this comes from a follow up to the experiment
mentioned earlier where participants tried to decide whether or not to drive a spacecraft
on Mars through inclement weather. The researchers assessed, among other variables, the
role of “felt-risk” and a positive perspective. They found that those in the experimental
condition, who had information that the craft had driven through bad weather on the
previous days, reported significantly lower “felt-risk” and more optimism about driving
through inclement weather than those in the control group who had no such information
(Dillon & Tinsley, 2008).
4. Illusion of Control –According to Langer (1975) “illusion of control” refers to the
tendency of people to estimate the likelihood of personal success as far greater than
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realistically warranted. Experimental evidence comes from a group of six studies where
the researchers made various skills salient in a game of chance. The participants
consistently overestimated how much control they had over the outcome even though the
outcome was completely determined by chance (Langer, 1975).
Moreover employees who overestimate their ability to control outcomes can
negatively affect a company’s bottom line. Fenton-Ocreevy, Nicholson, Soane &
Willman (2003) examined the relationship between illusion of control and work
productivity. Participants in their study were drawn from four different banking
corporations. The researchers found that there was a moderate negative correlation
between illusion of control and traders’ ability to regulate risk and earn profits for the
banks.
5. Change Blindness – It refers to our inability to notice changes in our visual field under
certain conditions (Simons & Chabris, 1999). This phenomenon is especially likely to
operate when change happen slowly (Simons, Franconeri, & Reimer, 2000). Failure to
notice key changes in the visual field has also been found to occur in regards to
perceptions of other peoples’ behavior. Specifically, participants were less likely to
notice behavior that became less ethical over time if it changed incrementally. In an
experiment, participants were shown a jar filled with coins. They were then shown a
number which was supposed to reflect approximately the number of coins in the jar.
Their task was to decide if the assessment was exaggerated (leaving some room for
error). Every time they identified the overestimation correctly they were rewarded. In the
sudden-change condition the assessment was exaggerated suddenly over one trial, i.e.
from trial 10 to 11, while in the incremental change condition the assessment was
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increased steadily by a few cents from trials 2 to 10. From 11th to 16th trial the
estimated figures were the same for both the conditions. Despite the reward for detecting
overestimated numbers, participants agreed with the numbers significantly more often in
the incremental change condition than in the sudden-change condition (Gino &
Bazerman, 2009).
6. Escalation of Commitment – When people think the alternative they selected led to poor
outcomes, they respond by devoting more resources to the selected alternative. In a study
by Staw (1976) with 240 students the researchers manipulated the first independent
variable as accountability (self v/s other) and the second independent variable as decision
outcomes (positive versus negative). The dependent variable was the amount of money
invested. Analysis of the data showed that participants devoted more money to a choice
they had made earlier but one that subsequently had a negative outcome. More recently
Moon (2001) examined the correlation between escalation of commitment and a sense of
obligation and need for achievement. They found that a sense of obligation was
negatively related to escalation of commitment while an achievement orientation was
positively related to escalation of commitment.
In summary, our limited cognitive capacities lead us to underestimate the role of luck in
our success, overestimate our control over outcomes while simultaneously blinding us to the
progressively increased risk we are taking keeping us committed to what has essential become a
losing proposition.
As mentioned earlier, our ideas of risk do not develop in a vacuum, but are developed in
collaboration with other people. Other members of the group often influence our ideas of risk
and our response to it.
12

Group Level Processes
One of the most widely studied and replicated group level phenomena that influences
decision-making, and consequently risk assessment, is Groupthink (Janis, 1972). Members of a
tightly-knit group in order to achieve unanimous decisions either fail to employ a thorough
search for alternative solutions or even when they do, fail to thoroughly evaluate these
alternative solutions. This narrow, rigid manner of thinking, according to Janis (1972), is
Groupthink. Groupthink is thus characterized by impoverished critical thinking, hypothesis
testing and ethical decision-making. Some reasons that lead to groupthink are:
1. The illusion of immunity – Members of a group think they are immune to the negative
consequences of their risky decisions.
2. The illusion of consonance – Members of a group believe that since they all reached the
same decision therefore it must be the right one. The members emphasize points of
agreement that enhance group harmony and de-emphasize points of disagreement that
could rupture group harmony.
3. Withholding personal reservations – The members of group hesitate to share any
uncertainties they might feel towards the efficacy of the decision to avoid being censured
by the group.
4. Self-designated mindguards– Even when an individual expresses doubts about the
decision there are people in the group who actively discourage this expression making it
more difficult for a critical analysis of the decision to occur.
Research has found evidence of groupthink in the series of decisions that led to the
launch of the Challenger shuttle. In one study researchers examined documents and transcripts of
testimony provided to the Presidential Commission investigating the launch and eventual
13

explosion of the shuttle. Researchers identified 88 statements that could be categorized from the
document and transcripts. Results indicated that 58 of these statements showed evidence of
groupthink. Specifically these statements were characterized by a push for consonance in
decisions, presence of self-designated mindguards, and stifling of contrary viewpoints – both
one’s own and other’s (Esser & Lindoerfer, 1989).
Thus, the group influences the individual members by censoring disagreements, leading
the members to believe that there is absolute agreement about the decision, and that they are
impervious to negative consequences of the decision.
Interaction of Individual and Group Level Processes – Social Learning
However, neither the group nor the individual are passive recipients of information. A
third mechanism through which individuals and, indirectly, the group learns is through social
learning. It is the result of the interaction between the individual and the group. According to
social learning theory (Bandura, 1977), an individual and his/her environment are engaged in a
relationship where both seek out and mutually reinforce each other’s behavior. Moreover, an
individual acquires behaviors as much by attending to others’ behaviors and the outcomes as
through first hand experiences.
Two experiments demonstrate how groups affect individual risk-taking and how
individuals, in turn, affect group risk-taking. In an experiment 167 participants who were
university students were divided into groups of six. They were presented with a questionnaire
that listed a series of options. The participants had to choose between a risky and a non-risky
option. Each participant had to complete this questionnaire three times - first individually,
second as a group through group debate, and third individually again after the group debate. The
total risk score was computed by summing over the options. The lower the score the more risk
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seeking the individual or group while the higher the score the more risk averse the individual or
group. Results indicated that i) when compared to individual scores before the debate with group
scores on the risk assessment questionnaire, groups were more risk seeking than individuals, and
ii) when compared to individual scores before the group debate with individual scores after the
debate, individuals made riskier decision after the group debate. The researchers therefore
concluded that a group can affect an individual members’ willingness to take risks (Wallach,
Kogan, & Bem, 1962). In another experiment 81 participants were divided into groups of three to
six. In the experimental group a confederate was planted as one of the group members while the
control groups had no confederate. The confederate either chose a risky option or a non-risky
one. Results indicated that the groups where the confederate had chosen the risky option tended
to choose more risky options while groups where the confederate had chosen the non-risky
option tended to choose the non-risky options. The researchers concluded that an individual can
affect the group’s willingness to take risks (Middleton & Warren, 1972).
Thus, both the individual and the group are engaged in a cyclical relationship where each
learns from and is shaped by the other.

Financial Decision-Making and Personality Psychology
The efficacy of financial decision-making is not always compromised by bounded
rationality, groupthink and social learning. Sometimes decision-making is compromised because
of innate personality traits. For instance, the Dark Triad of personality traits, consisting of
Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism, has been linked to increased risk-taking.
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There are some similarities and differences in the three dark triad traits. All three show a
lack of concern for the well-being of others in the pursuit of their goals. However, Machiavelli’s
are more far sighted and are able to delay gratification better than the other two personality
types. They can be kind or cruel to others and forge coalitions to accomplish their goals
depending on the circumstances. Psychopaths on the other hand are myopic and unable to delay
gratification. They often engage in high cost behavior with minimal benefits. Finally, narcissists
tend to think too highly of themselves and set goals that are often beyond their reach. They seek
validation from others. They usurp goods and services from others because they believe they are
superior to others. (Jones & Paulhus, 2011)
A study found that the higher the total score on the Dark Triad the greater the amount of
money risked in a game of blackjack. Of the three traits, narcissism accounted for most of the
variance in the amount of money risked by the participants (Crysel, Crosier, & Webster, 2013).
Jones (2013) found that individuals who are high in any of the Dark Triad traits cannot be trusted
with other people’s money. Specifically, individuals high in Machiavellianism and psychopathy
were willing to anonymously risk someone else’s money for personal profit. Further, among
those who made such risks, narcissism was associated with losing more money. In a separate
study that involved consequences, individuals high in psychopathy persisted in risking someone
else’s money for personal gain, even in the face of punishment (Jones, 2014). Lastly, research
has confirmed that there is a large number of such individuals who are drawn to business
(Babiak, Neumann, & Hare, 2010). Anecdotal evidence seems to support this finding. For
instance, recently when five major banks were found guilty of fixing the foreign exchange, one
Barclay bank employee was reported as saying, “If you ain’t cheating, you ain’t trying.”
(Corkery & Protess, 2015).
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Potential Contributions of the Study
Most of the research in the area of normalization of deviance has been carried out in the
areas of engineering (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008), natural calamities (Dillon, Tinsley & Cronin,
2011) and terroristic activity (Dillon, Tinsley & Burns, 2014). However, it has not yet been
studied in the context of financial decisions. The current study would add to the literature by
expanding our understanding of this construct in the area of monetary decisions.
Secondly, in the previous studies the outcome variable of risky behavior has been
examined as a binary variable in the area of normalization of deviance. For example, whether to
drive a spacecraft through inclement weather (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008), whether to evacuate
when faced with a natural calamity (Dillon, Tinsley & Cronin, 2011). This study will examine
risky behavior as a continuous variable.
Thirdly, the existing studies do not take into consideration a key aspect of the construct
which is time. Participants in the paradigm mentioned earlier make decisions only once about
whether or not they would commit to the course of action. However, normalization of deviance
unfolds gradually over time. Hence, the paradigm needed to study this should take that into
consideration. The current study measures the outcome at multiple times so that the trajectory of
the decision-making process could be examined more closely.
Thus, the current study hopes to add to the literature by examining normalization of
deviance in a new context of financial decision-making, developing a new paradigm specifically
to study financial decision-making and using a more robust statistical technique to analyze data. .
The aim of the study is to examine the construct of normalization of deviance over
time in the laboratory setting. We examine whether i) exposure to normalization of
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deviance induced individuals to take increasing monetary risks, and/or ii) inherent personality
traits like the dark triad induced individuals to take increasing monetary risks.
We hypothesize that the normalization of deviance (NOD) would be a predictor of
monetary investment such that participants in the NOD condition would invest more money over
trials than participants in the No-normalization of deviance (No-NOD) condition. This is
because NOD makes risk taking more acceptable. Having seen risk taking pay off the
participants on their part would be induced to take risk with money as well. We will be testing
only a minor component of NOD, specifically how exposure to NOD followed by positive
outcome influences financial risk taking.
Our second hypothesis is that NOD will interact with the dark triad personality traits such
that for every unit increase in dark triad score there will be an increase “in the slope of the
regression of” investment on NOD (Preacher, 2016). Past research has shown that those high on
the dark triad traits tend to be more risk seeking. Exposing such individuals to NOD which
makes risk taking more acceptable is likely to exacerbate these risk seeking tendencies leading to
an interaction between the two.
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Methods
Participants
Participants (N = 172) were recruited for this study at the University of Texas at El Paso
through the Sona System and using flyers and in-class announcements. A majority of the
participants were introductory psychology students. Participants were compensated for their time
with either course credit or a nominal amount of $15. Of these 172 participants, one failed to
read the scenarios and their data was removed from analyses. The data reported here are on 171
participants.
A majority of the 171 participants were female (68.4%), Hispanic (81.3%), EnglishSpanish bilingual (71.3%) and US. Citizens (92%). Their ages ranged from 18 to 51 years (Mage
= 22.11, SDage = 5.70). The data were collected between spring 2016 and fall 2016.
Design
The study was a one factor between-subjects design (normalization of deviance (NOD)
versus no-normalization of deviance (No-NOD)). Participants were randomly assigned to either
the NOD or No-NOD condition. The dependent variable was amount of money invested during
each trial. All participants played a minimum of 14 trials and a maximum of 25 trials.
Materials
Short Dark Triad – In order to assess the Dark Triad traits in brief fashion, I used the Short Dark
Triad or SD3 scale (Jones & Paulhus, 2014; Appendix A). The SD3 consists of three subscales
that capture each Dark Triad trait (Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism) with 9-items
per trait. All participants were scored on a 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) Likerttype scale. After reverse scoring appropriate items and adding the items to create a composite,
Machiavellianism (e.g., “it is not wise to share your secrets”) demonstrated adequate internal
19

consistency (α = .71). The same was true for narcissism (e.g., “I insist on getting the respect I
deserve” (α = .74) and psychopathy (e.g., “I will say anything to get what I want” (α = .77).
Research on the SD3 subscales has shown strong convergent validity, with the original Dark
Triad measures (Jones & Paulhus, 2014).
Narcissistic Personality Inventory-16 (NPI-16; Ames, Rose & Anderson, 2006; Appendix B) –
The third construct of the Dark Triad, Narcissism, will be assessed using the 16-item version of
the NPI. This scale is presented in binary format (narcissistic option vs. non-narcissistic option)
and correlates .90 with the full 40-item version of the scale. It has a test-retest reliability of .85.
This scale was added because the internal consistency of the SD3 narcissism subscale has had
issues with non-Caucasian samples (Jones, Neria, & Smith, in preparation).
Financial Decision-making game
For this study we developed twenty-five scenarios (Appendix C) that narrated the story of
a fictitious company, called ChipTech, over the course of its 20 year life, from its inception to
ascent to its eventual decline. These scenarios were developed by searching through the business
sections of newspapers and magazines for case histories of real companies, the crises they
experienced and their response to these crises. Each of the 25 scenarios had three sections – a
background, a dilemma and a decision. The background gave a short description about the
company at a particular time-point (for example, ChipTech’s beginnings as a startup in Silicon
Valley in 1995). The dilemma gave information about two mutually exclusive business activities
(for example, staying in Silicon Valley versus moving to Seattle). Lastly, the decision gave
information about the business activity that the Board of Directors chose to pursue (e.g. deciding
to move to Seattle). However, intentionally left out from these scenarios was the amount to be
invested (which was the dependent variable and decided by the participant). Furthermore
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scenarios for Trial 2 and Trial 4 were slightly different for the two conditions. This was because
the NOD was manipulated in those trials. For both these scenarios, while the background and the
dilemma were the same, the decision made by the Board of Directors differed between the two
conditions. For the NOD condition, the Board opted to live with the increased risk. For the NoNOD condition, the Board decided to take steps to mitigate the risk. A summarized version of
the scenarios is as follows:
Scenario 2
ChipTech had hired 20 new employees for its production plant. As per the Human
Resource policies, new employees had to go through the Standard Operating
Procedures training within a month of hire. The department in charge of producing
the microchips, however, felt that it would be impossible to set aside 20 employees
for training and meet the quarterly production goals at the same time. All managers,
except two, believed that employees had learned the procedures on their own.
(Dilemma) The Board of Directors had to decide whether to delay training for the
20 new employees.
NOD condition
…the Board felt they had enough evidence that the new employees had gathered a
basic understanding of the procedures on their own. They decided to delay
training for the 20 new employees.

No-NOD condition
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…the Board felt they had enough evidence that the new employees had not
gathered a basic understanding of the procedures on their own. They decided not
to delay training for the 20 new employees.
Scenario 4
ChipTech found that its microchips were overheating at low temperatures. In fact, one batch of
microchips exploded due to overheating injuring two employees. The Board of Directors had to
decide whether to go ahead with mass production or go back and redesign the chips.
NOD condition
The Board concluded that although exploding microchips due to over-heating
could be a concern there was not enough evidence to delay production. The
Board of Directors decided to go ahead with mass production of microchips.
No-NOD condition
The Board concluded that exploding microchips due to over-heating was a
concern. There was enough evidence to delay production. The Board of Directors
decided to go back and redesign microchips.
I also developed 25 outcomes corresponding to each of these 25 scenarios. Each outcome
revealed the result of the decision made by the Board of Directors. The outcomes were either
profits or losses as a percentage of the investment. Most of the outcomes were randomly
assigned, with a few exceptions. Specifically, all participants experienced a profit outcome on
trials one to five and trials 14, 15 and 25. Trials one to five were assigned a profit outcome
because the manipulation was embedded in these trials. Since outcome on the previous trial
could potentially interfere with the manipulation scenario of the current trial, I decided to
control for that by assigning all five trials a profit outcome. This allowed for the manipulation to
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take full effect. I also assigned a profit outcome to Trial 14, Trial 15 and Trial 25. After the 14th
trial, participants were given a choice to either stop or continue with playing more trials. Since
some participants might choose to stop at this point it would make Trial 14 the last trial for those
participants. Hence, Trial 14 was assigned a profit outcome. For those participants who chose to
continue Trial 15 was assigned a profit outcome so that it would serve as reward for continuing.
Lastly, trial 25 was assigned a profit outcome since it was the last trial for everyone in the study.
This trial was assigned a profit outcome to ensure that the participant left the study in a positive
mood.
All the twenty-five scenarios and twenty-five outcomes were pasted on individual 8x11
index cards. The scenarios and outcomes were then organized alternately such that a scenario
card was followed by an outcome card making a total of fifty cards in a set. All participants
irrespective of the condition saw the same order of cards. I made two sets, one for NOD
condition and the other for No-NOD condition. All the cards for the two conditions were exactly
the same except for scenario 2 and scenario 4.
Practice scenarios and outcomes. I also designed three practice scenarios with corresponding
outcomes (Appendix D). The practice scenarios were for a completely different company and
unrelated to the study scenarios.
Excel file. I developed an excel file to calculate the amount of profit and loss on each investment
decision as well as the earnings of the participant (Appendix E).
Monopoly money. I had monopoly money in the denominations of 20, 10 and 5 totaling $100 to
represent the amount in company’s bank account at the start of the trials.
Real Quarters. $2 to $3 worth of quarters were also kept in plain view of the participants.
Procedure
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The study was divided into two parts. The first part was administered online while the
second part was administered in the lab. For part one of the study, participants were provided a
link to an online survey on Qualtrics.com. After completing the informed consent they were
asked to complete two scales of SD3 and the NPI. Participants were given the freedom to
complete the online survey from on or off campus. Participants were asked to complete the part
one part one online survey at least 12 hours before completing part two or the inlab part of the
study.
For part two of the study, participants came into the laboratory to complete the financial
decision-making part of the study. Participants were again asked to read and sign an informed
consent form. They were then randomly assigned to either the NOD or the No-NOD condition.
Following this they were given instructions for part two of the study (See Appendix G for the
details).
They were told that they will be reading the case history of a real company and the
decision they make are real ones that the company faced. They will be playing the role of the
head of the financial department and their job title is Chief Financial Officer (CFO). It was their
job to decide how much of the company’s money to invest into a business activity that the Board
of Directors has chosen. In other words, in the scenarios they read, the Board of Directors
decided in what business activity to invest, but the participants decided how much to invest .
They were informed that at the start of the trials the company has a $100 million dollars in its
bank account as represented by monopoly money. They could invest anywhere between $1
million and the total money in the company’s bank account. They were then explained how the
excel file was set up (e.g. where they would see the amount they invested, how much money they
earned or lost etc.). They were told that their task was to pick up a card from the top of a stack
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of cards on which will be the background information of the company and the dilemma called
crossroad that the Board of Directors faced. Also on the card was the decision that the Board of
Directors made. After this the participants were asked to decide the amount of money in the
business activity that the Board of Directors had chosen. The amount they decided was entered
into the excel file. After that they were asked to pick up another card from the top of the stack
which informed them about the outcome of their decision.
Participants were told that some outcomes made them profits others made them losses.
They were informed that for every $10 million in monopoly money they earned for their
company they will earn themselves a quarter (¢25) in real money. For every $10 million in
monopoly money they lost their company they would lose a quarter (¢25) in real money. They
were free to keep the money they earn during the study at the end of the study. The goal was to
make as much profit as possible for the company. They were informed that the four participants
who make the most profit for the company will be awarded a $25 gift card. The participants first
practiced with three rounds of practice trials. (See Appendix B for details). The participants were
encouraged to ask questions during the practice trails. The experimenter answered any questions
the participants had and then started the main trails. The amount of money that the participants
chose to invest was entered directly on to the excel file. After the 14th trial they were informed
that they could choose to stop at any point after this trial. They were asked if they wanted to stop
or continue. The reason for allowing participants to drop out was so that we could carry out an
exploratory analysis to see if the number of participants who drop out from the NOD condition is
significantly different from those in the No-NOD condition.
During the trials we tried to ego involve the participants by using i) scenarios drawn from
real life ii) real money participants could earn, and iii) a chance to win $25 gift card.
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After the main trials participants were filled out a basic demographics questionnaire that also
asked about their broad financial status like whether they had loans or insurance (Appendix E).
Finally participants were paid their winnings, compensated for their time with research credit or
money, debriefed, thanked and escorted out of the lab.
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Results
I analyzed the data using a repeated measures multilevel modeling (MLM) framework
(Snijders & Bosker, 2012) with IBM SPSS software version 21 (2012; Heck, Thomas, & Tabata,
2011). I followed the recommendations laid out by Hayes (2006) for building and running the
various MLM models.
The repeated measures MLM was used to analyze the data since it offers some clear
advantages over repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). The repeated measures
ANOVA makes two key assumptions. The first is homogeneity of variance, in other words, that
all the elements along the diagonal in the variance-covariance matrix are identical. The second is
compound symmetry, in other words, all the elements on the off diagonal in the variancecovariance matrix are identical. At times the rigid assumption of compound symmetry is
replaced with the less rigid assumption of sphericity, in other words, the differences between
covariances or the off diagonal elements is identical (Keppel & Wickens, 2004)l. However, these
assumptions hardly ever hold. Repeated measures MLM is robust to the violations of these
assumptions. Repeated measures MLM is also robust to different participants completing
different number of trials, different participants starting and ending different trials at different
times. Due to all these reasons, repeated measures MLM is a better statistical technique to
analyze the current data.
Data Cleaning. If a student completed the survey multiple times the one closest in time to the
inlab part was used. If a student completed the in-lab part more than once only the first one was
used.
The means for the manipulation trials - Trial 2 and Trial 4 – were first examined to
determine whether the manipulation was successful. For Trial 2, the mean investment for NOD
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condition (M = 6.95, SD =10.383) was smaller than for No-NOD condition (M = 8.39, SD
=10.101). However, this difference was not statistically significant, t(169) = -.913, p = .362. For
trial 4, the mean investment for NOD condition (M = 8.78, SD =12.813) was smaller than for
No-NOD condition (M = 18.45, SD =19.438). This difference was statistically significant, t(169)
= -3.907, p <.01. Since both groups responded significantly differently, I concluded that the
manipulation had been successful (See Appendix H for details).
I therefore proceeded with model testing. The data were organized at two levels with the
trials (t) nested within participants (i). Thus the trials were at level one and the participants were
at level two. I had one level one predictor – time and four level two predictors – Normalization
of Deviance, Machiavellianism, Psychopathy and Narcissism. A maximum likelihood (ML)
estimator was used for all the models since I wanted to compare the different models based on
their Log likelihood (Snjider & Bosker, 2012, pp. 89). I used an unstructured variance covariance
matrix for estimating the random effects.
I first fitted the null model which is so called because it has no predictors. This model
helped us answer the question whether an MLM framework is actually appropriate for this data.
In other words, whether there is substantial unexplained variance at level two.
Level 1
Investmentti =
Level 2
β0i =
Reduced form
Investmentti =
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In the equation above,

average investment of all participants across all trials,

refers to variation between participants and

refers to the variation within trials.

Analysis showed that the average amount (

invested across all 171 participants across

all trials was 19.261 and this was significantly different from zero, t(171) = 17.179, p < .001, SE
= 1.121. The

was examined in order to determine whether there was leftover variance in the

model at the level of participants. It is shown by the Greek letter
matrix. The unexplained variance (

00)

00 in

the variance-covariance

was 203.893 (Wald Z = 8.77, p < .001) and this was

significant. However, the total variance that can be attributed to differences between participants
still needed to be determined. The leftover variance between trials,
letter

2

, is shown by the Greek

was 276.444 (Wald Z= 45.299, p < .001). Using this information the intra-class

correlation coefficient was calculated with the formula below, where
unexplained variance between participants and

2

00 represents

the

represents the unexplained variance within

trials.
≈ .4245
The ICC for the null model was .4245. This can be interpreted as 42.45% of the variance
in the amount invested can be attributed to variance between individuals. In other words, there
are in fact differences between participants in how much they invest on an average across trials
leading to the conclusion that the data lends itself to an MLM analysis.
The second model was then tested where a level-one predictor (Time) was added to the
model. I tested two time functions – linear time and quadratic time. This allowed us to determine
the shape of investment curve. I coded trial 1 as time 0 (zero). This means that the intercept can
be interpreted as the investment of the participant when time is 0 that is, a participant’s
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investment at trial 1. The slope of quadratic time was fixed in order to ensure that the model is
identified.
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Table 1: Parameter Estimates for the Three Models Examining the Relationship between NOD
and Investment
Model 1
Null Model
(No Predictors)

Model 2
Level-1 Predictor
(Time)

Model 3
Level-2 Predictor
(NOD)

Fixed
component
s
Intercept

Linear
Time

Quadratic
time

NOD

00

10

20

01

19.261***

14.955***

16.073***

t (171) = 17.179
S.E = 1.121
CI: 17.047, 21.474

t (224.756) = 11.650
SE = 1.284
CI: 12.425, 17.485

t (196.354 ) = 9.046
SE= 1.777
CI: 12.569, 19.577

-

0.741***

.746***

t (1642.596) = 5.223
SE = .1419
CI: 0.463, 1.020

t(785.277) = 4.605
SE =0 .162
CI: 0.428, 1.064

-0.023***

-0.023***

t (3933) = -4.687
SE =0 .005
CI: -0.033, -0.014

t(3933) = -4.687
SE = 0.005
CI = -0.033, -0.014

-

-2.172

-

-

t(171) = -0.908
SE = 2.393
CI: -6.895, 2.551,
p = 0.365
NOD *
Time_Lin

11

-

-

-0.010
t(171) = -.063
SE = 0.152
CI: -0.309, 0.290,
p = .950

Variance of
random
component
s
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Intercept
variance

Slope
variance

Intercept
*Slope
covarianc
e

00

11

01

2

Deviance
(-2LL)

203.893***

211.065***

209.887***

Wald Z = 8.77
SE = 23.24
CI: 163.061,
254.950

Wald Z = 7.940
SE = 26.582
CI: 164.897, 270.158

Wald Z = 7.934
SE =26.455
CI: 163.945, 268.703

-

0.809***

0.809***

Wald Z = 7.584
SE = 0.107
CI: 0.625, 1.048

Wald Z = 7.589
SE = 0.107
CI: .625, 1.048

-5.0758

-5.081***

Wald Z = -3.869
SE = 1.312
CI: -7.647, -2.504

Wald Z = -3.880
SE = 1.310
CI: -7.648, -2.514

276.444***

229.643

229.644***

Wald Z= 45.299
SE = 6.103
CI: 264.738,
288.668
36673.416

Wald Z = 44.345
SE = 5.179
CI: 219.715, 240.021

Wald Z = 44.345
SE = 5.179
CI: 219.715, 240.021

36187.937

36186.817

Model 1- Model 2
χ2 (4) = 485.48*

Model 2-Model3
χ2 (2) = 1.119*

-

-

Deviance
-

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Level 1
Investmentti =
Level 2
β0i =
β1i =
β2i =

Reduced form
Investmentti =

Analysis showed that the intercept

was 14.955 and this was significantly different

from 0 (zero), t(225) = 11.650, p < .001. There was significant unexplained intercept variance
[

00 =

211.065, Wald Z = 7.940, SE = 26.582, p < .001].
The slope for linear time

was .741 and this was significant, t(1643) = 5.223, p < .001.

In other words, for every unit increase in trials the investment increases by .741 million and this
increase is significant, holding all else constant. There was significant unexplained variance for
linear time [

11 =

0.809, Wald Z = 7.584, SE = 0.107, p < .001]. The slope for quadratic time

was -.023 and this too was significant t(3933) = -4.687, p < .001.
Model fit between model 1 and model 2 was also compared. Specifically, I compared the
difference in Deviance (-2Log Likelihood) between model 1 and model 2. The deviance was
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reduced by 485.48 from model 1 to model 2 and this was a significant reduction [χ2(4) = 485.48,
p < .05]. This means that model two fits the data better than model one.
In the third model a level-two predictor was tested to determine if it could explain the
unexplained variance in the intercept and slope. Here, No-NOD was coded as 0 (zero) while
NOD was coded as 1. I added NOD as a level-two predictor to both the intercept and the slope of
linear time of the previous model.

Level 1
Investmentti =
Level 2
β0i =
β1i =
β2i =
Reduced form
Investmentti=

Analysis revealed that the intercept

was 16.073 and significantly different from zero

[t (196.354) = 9.046, SE= 1.777, p < .001].
The intercept for no-normalization of deviance

was -2.172. That is, from NOD to No-

NOD condition the investment dropped by 2.172, holding all else constant. However, this
decrease was not significant, t(171) = -0.908, SE = 2.393, p = .365. Thus, NOD was not a
significant predictor of investment.
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The interaction of condition and linear time was also not significant

-0.010, t(171)

= -0.063, SE = 0.152, p = .950; see Figure 1]. In the Figure 1, the black line represents
investment by NOD condition while the dashed line represents the No-NOD condition. The Xaxis represents the 25 trials while mean investment is represented on the Y-axis.

Figure 1: Average investment across trials by condition.
The unexplained variance continued to be significant [
=5.179, p < .001;

11=

00 = 209.887,

Wald Z = 44.345, SE

.809, Wald Z = 7.589, SE = 0.107, p < .001]. This indicates that more

predictors could be added to the model. I also compared model fit between model 2 and model 3.
Specifically we compared the difference in deviance (-2LL) between model 2 and model 3.
There was a significant reduction in deviance [χ2(2) = 1.119, p < .05].
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Finally, I explored a fourth model wherein I examined the interaction between condition
and each of the dark triad traits. There was no significant interaction between NOD and
Machiavellianism [γ = -0.323, t(175) = -.803, SE = 0.402, p = 0.423], between NOD and
Psychopathy [γ = 0.356, t(175) = 0.580, SE = 0.614, p = 0.563] and between NOD and
Narcissism [γ =0.592, t(173) = 0.950, SE =0.623, p = 0.344].

Exploratory Analysis
The means for the trials immediately following Trial 4 which was the second manipulation were
explored. I found that NOD participants invested a little more than No-NOD condition for three
consecutive trials immediately following Trial 4 (Trial 5: MNOD = 16.72 versus MNo-NOD =15.81,
Trial 6: MNOD = 18.92 versus MNo-NOD = 18.46; Trial 7: MNOD = 17.67 versus MNo-NOD =16.63).
However, this difference was not statistically significant (Trial 5: t(169) = .321, p = .749; Trial 6:
t(169) = .171, p = .865; Trial 7: t(169) =.328, p = .749).
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Figure 2. Average investment across Trial 5 to Trial 7.
After experiencing their first loss on Trial 7, NOD present participants invested at
consistently lower rates from trial eight onwards and stayed below No-NOD participants for
most of the remaining trials (except trial 20). After the first loss the NOD participants became
risk averse and continued to be consistently risk averse for most of the remaining trials.
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Figure 3. Average investment across Trials 8 to Trial 25.
I also carried out a Chi-square to examine whether more participants chose to continue in
one condition in comparison to the other immediately after Trial 14. However, there was no
significant difference between participants who chose to continue playing in NOD condition
compared to No-NOD condition (χ2 (1, 171) = .001, p = .980)
I examined one demographic variable to assess whether it predicted investment - prior
loans (e.g. student loans, car loans, mortgage, etc.). Approximately 42% of the participants did
not have any kinds of loans while 53% of the participants had some kind of prior loan. The
variable ‘loans’ was a significant predictor of investment,
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01 = 3.815,

t(171) = 2.363, p = .019.

This indicates that as we move from having no loans to having prior loans the investment
increases by approximately 3 million and this increase is significant.
I tested a second exploratory model. Since NOD was not a significant predictor I
removed it as a predictor from the model and added the three dark triad traits to examine whether
personality traits by themselves predict investment.
Level 1
Investmentti =
Level 2
β0i =
β1i =
β2i =
MODEL 2 Reduced form

Analysis showed that the grand intercept was no longer significantly different from zero
[

00 =14.720,

t(172) = .959, SE =15.347, p = .339. Similarly, the slope for the linear time was no

longer significant,

10 =

Machiavellianism (

0.355, t(177) = 0.362, SE = 0.981, p = 0.718. The intercept for
was 0.255, t(171) =0.898, SE = 0.285, p = .371. That is, for every unit

increase in Machiavellianism score, the investment increased by about a quarter of a million.
However this increase was not significant. The intercept for Psychopathy

was -0.199,

t(171) =-0.483, SE = 0.413, p =.630. That is, for every unit increase in Psychopathy score the
investment decreased by about 0.20 million. However, this decrease was not significant. The
intercept for Narcissism

03) was

-0.15. That is, for every unit increase in Narcissism scores the
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investment decreased by 0.15 million. However, this decrease was not significant, t(171) = 0.385, SE = 0.390, p = 0.701. The interaction between the three Dark Triad personality traits and
linear time was also not significant (see Appendix J for details).
The unexplained variance continued to be significant,
= 26.383, p < .001;

11

00 =

209.212, Wald Z = 7.930, SE

= -5.142, Wald Z = -3.930, SE = 1.308, p < .001;

2

= 229.644, Wald Z =

44.345, SE = 5.179, p < .001]. In other words, additional predictors could be added to the model.

Finally, we tested a piecewise growth model for trials 4 to 7 using a different dependent
variable, ‘percent risked’. One of the advantages of piecewise growth is that it enables us to test
different trends for different groups of (consecutive) trials (Curran, Obeidat, & Losardo, 2010;
Chou, Yang, Pentz, & Hser, 2004). In our study we tested a model where for trials 1 to 4 it is
assumed that there is no change in slope and a linear trend for trials 5 to 7. We also used a
different ‘percentage risked’ as a dependent variable because percentage risked might more
accurately measure the amount of risk undertaken by the participant than ‘investment’. Two
participants might invest the same amount of money but might be undertaking different amounts
of risk depending on the amount they had at hand or how much money they had earned up to that
trial. For example, suppose two participants on trial 4 invested 4 million. However, participant
one had 5 million at hand while participant two had 10 million. In that case, participant one is
clearly the more risk seeking of the two for investing 4 million out of 5 million or 80% of his
money while participant is less risk seeking of the two since for investing only 4 million out of
10 million or 40% of his money. We calculated the percent risked for each participant for each
trial. Using percent risked as the DV we reanalyzed the data using piecewise growth with Mplus
version 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012).
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We examined trials 4 to 7 using three slope functions (See Appendix K for details.
Specifically, we examined whether there was a significant growth from trial 4 to trial 5 (slope 1),
from trial 5 to 6 (slope 2) and from trial 6 to 7 (slope 3). Analysis indicated that participants in
the NOD condition had a significantly steeper slope 1 by 10.211 points than those in No-NOD
condition (S.E. = 2.428, p < .01). The other two slopes were not significant (Slope 2 = -0.263,
S.E. = 2.451, p = 0.914; Slope 3 = 0.259, S.E. = 2.916, p = 0.929). Furthermore, we also
examined the relationship between the intercept and the three slopes. There is a significant
negative relationship between intercept and slope 1 (γ = -86.154, S.E. = 18.805, p < 0.01) and a
significant positive relationship between intercept and slope 3 (γ = 43.431, S.E. = 21.413, p =
0.043). The relationship between intercept and slope 2 although negative is not significant (γ = 15.489, S.E. = 17.820, p = 0.385).
Finally, there is still significant unexplained variance remaining in the model for the
intercept (γ = 213.77, S.E. = 23.118, p < 0.01), slope 1 (γ = 248.16, S.E. = 26.84, p < 0.01), slope
2 (γ = 252.89, S.E. = 27.35, p < 0.01) and slope 3 (γ = 357.95, S.E. = 38.711, p < 0.01). This
indicates that additional predictors could be added to the model. Since NOD was the primary
variable of interest, no additional variables were added to the model. However, future studies
should consider adding time variant and invariant covariates to further explain the residual
variance in the model.
In summary, piecewise growth analyses look encouraging but need to be cross-validated on a
fresh sample.
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Discussion
The aim of the present study was to examine normalization of deviance (NOD) in a
laboratory setting. Specifically I examined i) whether exposure to NOD encouraged individuals
to take monetary risks, and ii) whether callous-manipulative personality traits like the Dark Triad
interacted with NOD.
The first hypothesis was that NOD would predict monetary investment such that
participants in the NOD condition would invest more money over trials than participants in the
No-NOD condition. This hypothesis was not supported. There was no significant difference in
investment between participants in the NOD condition compared to no-NOD condition across
the 25 experimental trials. These results contradict the findings of previous studies that risky
behavior becomes normalized for the individuals who are exposed to it repeatedly (Dillon &
Tinsley (2008). However, there were two aspects of the current experiment that were different
from Dillon & Tinsley (2008). First, two important constraints were placed on participants in
the previous studies. First, participants had a specific target to meet, i.e. the spacecraft had to
reach a prespecified destination on Mars, and second, participants were penalized for being
excessively risk aversive, i.e. they lost $5 of their remuneration of $20. In the current
experiment, no such constraints or penalties were imposed. Most participants in our study had
very little financial decision-making experience. For such participants setting specific targets
would have led to a large number failing to meet those targets. This might have led to poor
response rate and/or high attrition rate. The absence of these constraints may have freed
participants to make the best decision for their company, rather than engage in risky behavior.
Thus, the former study might have evoked a sense of achievement in participants of their study,
whereas the current experiment might have evoked a sense of obligation to the company in the
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participants. This explanation would be align with the findings of Moon (2001) who found that a
sense of achievement was positively correlated with an escalation of commitment whereas a
sense of obligation to the company was negatively correlated with escalation of commitment.
Thus, the present task may have failed to engage participants in the right frame for NOD to lead
to an escalation of risk.
Another potential difference is in terms of the amount of cognitive load that was placed
on the participants in the two experiments. In a previous study using a similar paradigm of the
Mars spacecraft, the researchers found that participants in the no-cognitive load and No-NOD
condition were significantly less likely to normalize deviance (Dillon & Tinsely (2005). In the
current study participants did not have to divide their resources between the targets they were
trying to reach, trying to retain their remuneration and the investment. They could devote all
their cognitive resources to the scenario and their own investment decision. This could have
weakened the relationship between NOD and investment. Thus, the low cognitive load on the
participants in my experiment might have freed the participants to make effective decisions.
Exploratory analysis of the first and second NOD exposure or Trial 2 and Trial 4 found
that on Trial 2 there was no significant difference between the NOD and No-NOD participants in
their amount of investment while there was a significant difference between participants on Trial
4 with NOD participants investing significantly less than No-NOD participants.
One prior study examined the number of exposure to NOD exposures and its influence on
risky behavior (Dillon, Tinsley & Burns, 2014). They found no significant difference between
participants who experienced No-NOD and one NOD exposure. For those who experienced no
NOD and three NOD exposures, they found significant differences between participants, wherein
participants in the NOD condition were more likely to engage in risky behavior. The study did
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not look at two NOD exposures. We examined two NOD exposures versus none and the degree
of risk taking behavior. Similar to the previous study, one exposure did not lead to any
significant differences between the experimental and the control group. However, the second
NOD exposure led participants to invest significantly less than No-NOD exposure participants.
Although this might on the face of it contradict previous empirical study it is in line with the five
step NOD process where during step 2 there is a recognition of increased risk. In other words,
participants sensed there was something atypical or even egregious about the behavior and
responded to it by being extremely cautious.
We investigated the trials immediately following the second exposure, i.e. trials 5, 6 and
7. These showed a slight although not significant increase in investment by NOD participants
compared to No-NOD participants. This extreme risk averse behavior in the aftermath of NOD
but risk seeking behavior in the following trials hints towards the role of outcome bias in leading
to risky decision. Because the risky decision did not have negative consequences individuals
might feel more confident about future risky decision and become risk seeking.
Exploratory analyses of Trial 8 revealed that the investment size of the NOD participants
dropped below that of the No-NOD participants though not significantly. In the trial previous to
this drop, participants had experienced a loss outcome for the first time. Thus, having
experienced a loss on the previous trial, all participants became risk averse on the subsequent
trial with NOD participants slightly more so than No-NOD participants. Moreover, NOD
participants continued to be more risk averse for most of the remaining trials.
The second hypothesis was that the NOD would interact with traits that compose the
Dark triad of personality (i.e., Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy). This hypothesis was
also not supported. There was no significant interaction between NOD and scores on any of the
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Dark Triad traits. These findings seem to contradict previous findings that the Dark Triad are
linked with high levels of risk (Crysel, Crosier, & Webster, 2013). However, Crysel and
colleagues used a measure of the Dark Triad (The “Dirty Dozen;” Jonason & Webster, 2010) that
has fallen into disrepute (e.g., Miller et al., 2012). Further, the framing of the study as a business
decision making task as compared to a gambling task may have influenced risk behavior in the
two studies differently. Specifically, Crysel and colleagues (2013) examined amount risked in
the game of blackjack whereas the current study was framed as a decision making study in
business. Thus, the present study could have motivated individuals to make the best decision.
It should be noted that the Dark Triad traits are not associated with poor decision making
in all financial contexts. For example, Jones (2013) found that risking one’s own money on a
bad decision was uncorrelated with all three Dark Triad traits (Jones, 2013; Study 1). However,
when someone else would suffer the losses, individuals high in psychopathy and
Machiavellianism were willing to make a bad decision. However, Jones (2014) found that only
those high in psychopathy persisted in making selfish decisions when they could be punished.
Thus, it is surprising in the present study that psychopathic individuals did not engage in higher
levels of investment for risk-based decisions.
Thus, when individuals high in the Dark Triad have ‘no skin in the game’ they seem to be
more risk prone, especially when someone else would pay for the losses. However, in the
current study, participant’s profits and losses were tied to the company’s profits and losses.
Further, studies on risk behaviors and the Dark Triad (using appropriate assessments) found no
effect for Dark Triad and risk when personal profit was tied to decision making (Carré & Jones,
2016).
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Finally, we examined one demographic variable that might be a predictor of investment.
Analysis revealed that having prior loans was a predictor of the amount invested such that those
with prior loans invested significantly higher amounts of money than those with no prior loans.
Loans might be an indirect indicator of financial knowledge. Previous studies have shown that
financial knowledge has low to moderate correlation with financial risk seeking (Wang, 2009).
Thus, participants who have financial loans might possess more financial knowledge, might feel
more confident about handling money and therefore be more open to taking on financial risks.
Limitations
The study had three main limitations. The first limitation was is the design of the study.
The study did not put substantial cognitive load on the participants. This allowed participants to
devote ample resources to decision-making and they were able to avoid engaging in deviant
behavior.
A second limitation was that most of the students lacked financial experience. A majority
of the participants came from introductory psychology classes. Financial knowledge is an
important predictor in determining how much financial risk individuals assume. Therefore the
decision making of the participants might not necessarily reflect the decision-making of
individuals with more financial expertise.
A third limitation of this study was that a majority of the participants making investment
decisions in the study were female. In the financial sector, decision-making is predominantly in
the hands of males. For example, according to Equal Opportunity Commission (2015) in the
monetary goods and services sector, while 50% of entry and middle management positions are
held by women, women hold only 30% of upper management positions. According to another
report although 45% of those employed in Standard & Poor 500 companies are women, they
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hold only 25% of upper management positions and a meager 5% of the top position in
companies. (Catalyst, 2016). Prior studies indicate that there are sex differences in risk behavior
with men often tending to assuming more risk than women (Powell & Ansic, 1997; Byrnes,
Miller & Schafer, 1999). Therefore, the decision-making of the participants in the sample may
not reflect the decision-making in the financial sector.
Future Directions
In the future, studies could examine the role of achievement in normalization of deviance,
for example by making specific targets salient and imposing penalties for failing to meet them.
Studies could also examine how cognitive load might play a role in normalization of deviance.
Specifically, they could probe how cognitive load interacts with normalization of deviance in
investment decisions. Studies could also try to parse the effects of profits as compared to losses
on normalization of deviance, for example by introducing loss at different trials for different
groups. Future research could also investigate the role of financial knowledge and its interaction
with normalization of deviance, for example by recruiting participants from business schools.
Contributions of the current study
Although in the current study normalization of deviance was not found to significantly
predict risky behavior, the study did contribute to the existing literature on normalization of
deviance. Firstly, the current study examined the construct of normalization of deviance in the
new context of financial decisions. Second, we developed a new paradigm to investigate
normalization of deviance. Lastly, compared to previous studies, a more robust statistical model
was used to analyze the data.
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Appendix A
The Short Dark Triad
Instructions: Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements
1 – Disagree strongly
2 – Disagree
3 – Neither agree nor disagree
4 – Agree
5 – Agree strongly
Machiavellianism
1. It is not wise to tell your secrets.
2. I like to use clever manipulation to get my way.
3. Whatever it takes, you must get the important people on your side.
4. Avoid direct conflict with others because they may be useful in the future.
5. It’s wise to keep track of information that you can use against people later.
6. You should wait for the right time to get back at people.
7. There are things you should hide from other people to preserve your reputation.
8. Make sure your plans benefit yourself, not others.
9. Most people can be manipulated.
Psychopathy
1. I like to get revenge on authorities.
2. I avoid dangerous situations. (R)
3. Payback needs to be quick and nasty.
4. People often say I’m out of control.
5. It’s true that I can be mean to others.
6. People who mess with me always regret it.
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Appendix B
Narcissism Personality Inventory – 16 item.
Instructions: There are sixteen paired statements. For each pair choose the one that is closest to
your feeling.



I know that I am good because everybody keeps telling me so
When people compliment me I sometimes get embarrassed




I like to be the center of attention
I prefer to blend in with the crowd




I think I am a special person
I am no better nor worse than most people




I like having authority over people
I don’t mind following orders




I find it easy to manipulate people
I don’t like it when I find myself manipulating people




I insist upon getting the respect that is due me
I usually get the respect that I deserve




I am apt to show off if I get the chance
I try not to be a show off




I always know what I am doing
Sometimes I am not sure of what I am doing




Everybody likes to hear my stories
Sometimes I tell good stories




I expect a great deal from other people
I like to do things for other people
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I really like to be the center of attention
It makes me uncomfortable to be the center of attention




People always seem to recognize my authority
Being an authority doesn’t mean that much to me




I am going to be a great person
I hope I am going to be successful




I can make anybody believe anything I want them to
People sometimes believe what I tell them




I am more capable than other people
There is a lot that I can learn from other people



I am an extraordinary person



I am much like everybody else
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Appendix C
ChipTech, a software company, was formed by a group of young graduates from Stanford
University as a small start-up around 1995. At that time it made a name for itself manufacturing
microchips for home and office computer. In 1997 the company had to make the first of many
important decisions. The existing factory and office in Silicon Valley were too small to meet the
needs of a growing company.
Crossroad 1: The Board of Directors had to decide whether to move its factory to Bakersfield,
California and its offices to Seattle. Having a production plant in Bakersfield would give
ChipTech easy access to the local oil and natural gas industry, petroleum refineries and mining
companies. Moving its office to Seattle would give it an opportunity to network with other tech
companies like Amazon and Google. However, there was no guarantee that this move would
benefit the company.
Decision 1: The Board of Directors decided to move the factory to Bakersfield and office to
Seattle. They left it to their Chief Financial Officer, that is you, to decide how much to invest in
this business activity. How much of the company’s money would you like to invest?

Outcome 1: ChipTech earned a 3% profit on its investment by moving the production plant to
Bakersfield and office to Seattle.
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Around the same time, ChipTech also hired 20 new employees for its production plant. As per
the Human Resource policies, new employees had to go through the Standard Operating
Procedures training within a month of hire. The department in charge of producing these
microchips, however, felt that it would be impossible to set aside 20 employees for training and
meet the quarterly production goals at the same time. The company had already missed one
deadline. If the company did not meet the quarterly goals it would greatly reduce the profits. It
was a very stressful time for all the employees.
The Board of Directors called a meeting of the managers to discuss the problem. Most managers
reported that there had been no major accidents which according to them showed that the new
employees had learned the procedures on their own. Two managers, however, disagreed with
this assessment. The first manager said she had seen at least one new employee almost get hit by
a cargo truck most probably because he was unaware of the safety rules. The second manager
reported that he had also seen four or five new employees walking around the silicon processing
room without masks. These masks are mandatory in the room where silicon is processed to
prevent inhaling poisonous chemicals. He said he ordered the new employees to go to the health
care center immediately so the doctor could test them for dangerous chemicals.
Crossroad 2: The Board of Directors had to decide whether to delay training for the 20 new
employees. However, there was no guarantee that the decision to delay training would help the
company achieve its production goals.
Decision 2: Based on the discussion with managers, the Board felt they had enough evidence that
the new employees had gathered a basic understanding of the procedures on their own. They
decided to delay training for the 20 new employees. They left it to their Chief Financial Officer
to decide how much to invest in the production of microchips. How much of the company’s
money would you like to invest?

Outcome 2: ChipTech made a 10% profit on its investment by delaying training and focusing on
production
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Soon after, the company decided to expand into Asia. This was a completely new territory for the
company.
Crossroad 3: The Board of Directors had to decide whether to partner with a firm in Asia.
Partnering with an Asian firm would help ChipTech sell its product to a larger market. But there
was no guarantee the partnership would succeed.
Decision 3: The board of directors decided to invest in partnering with a firm in Asia. They left
it to their Chief Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in the business activity. How
much of the company’s money would you like to invest?

Outcome 3: ChipTech made a 2% profit on its investment by partnering with a firm in Asia.
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In 1998, ChipTech expanded into making specialized heat-resistant microchips for companies
that often work deep inside the core of the earth like those that mine for metals. Heat-resistant
microchips are microchips that are expected to withstand heat from anywhere from 392o F to
482o F Unfortunately, the company found that its microchips were overheating at much lower
temperatures. In fact, one batch of microchips exploded due to overheating injuring two
employees. The two employees had to be rushed to the emergency room after been badly burned
by these exploding microchips.
Crossroad 4: The Board of Directors had to decide whether to go ahead with mass production or
go back and redesign the chips. There was no guarantee that redesigning would prevent
overheating. The Board had a long discussion on how to deal with this issue. They took a closer
look at the evidence to see if it was serious.
Decision 4: The Board concluded that although exploding microchips due to over-heating could
be a concern there was not enough evidence to delay production. The Board of Directors decided
to go ahead with mass production of microchips. They left it to their Chief Financial Officer to
decide how much to invest in the business activity. How much of the company’s money would
you like to invest?

Outcome 4: ChipTech earned an 8% profit on its investment by going ahead with mass
production of microchips even though exploding microchips due to over-heating was a problem.
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Crossroad 5: By this time, ChipTech had been around for a while. The market landscape had
changed quite a bit since the company first started. The Board of Directors had to decide whether
to invest money into market research. Market research might help ChipTech recognize its own
strengths and weaknesses, identify new clients as well as better understand needs of the existing
clients. On the other hand, it might not tell them anything new.
Decision 5: The Board of Directors decided to invest money into market research. How much of
the company’s money would you like to invest?
Outcome 5: ChipTech made a 4% profit on its investment in market research.

In 1999, ChipTech wanted to try to increase its popularity in the U.S. markets. Hiring a
prestigious advertising firm could help it run advertisements not only on traditional platforms
like television and radio but also on newer platforms like the internet. Of course, if they put in
more money towards advertisements they would have less money for other activities.
Crossroad 6: The Board of Directors had to decide whether to hire a prestigious advertising
firm. There was no guarantee that it would make them popular.
Decision 6: The Board of Directors decided to hire a prestigious advertising firm. They left it to
their Chief Financial Officer to decide how much to invest into advertising. How much of the
company’s money would you like to invest?

Outcome 6: ChipTech made a 12% profit on its investment in advertising.
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Around 2000, the Board of Directors realized that the demand for microchips from mining
companies had not grown in the past five years. They need to expand into new markets. Entering
the market for self-driving cars seemed like the most logical choice. The market for self-driving
cars was relatively new at that time. Most companies were still testing the prototypes and no one
really knew how long it would take for a company to build a fully functional self-driving car.
Crossroad 7: The Board had to decide whether to expand into other markets. There was
no guarantee they would find customers.
Decision 7: After much deliberation, the Board of Directors decided to expand and enter
the market for self-driving cars. They left it to their Chief Financial Officer to decide how
much to invest in the business activity. How much of the company’s money would you
like to invest?
Outcome 7: ChipTech made a 6% loss on its investment in self-driving cars.

Crossroad 8: The following year in 2001, in order to gain visibility ChipTech had to decide
whether to sponsor a convention like Comic-con. They would invite video game players, also
called gamers, from all over the country. It would be a fun, high energy event lasting a week.
The downside however, was that the event might fail. This would give them bad reviews in all
technological magazines ruining the company name.
Decision 8: In the end, the Board of Directors decided to sponsor a convention. They left it to
their Chief Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in the business activity. How much of
the company’s money would you like to invest?

Outcome 8: ChipTech made a 9% profit on its investment.
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The competition in the microchip market was getting intense. In order to attract new customers
and hold on to old ones, ChipTech had to figure out ways that would help it stand out from other
companies.
Crossroad 9: ChipTech had to decide whether to offer free maintenance services to its clients.
The Board did not know if this would be enough to keep their lead in the market.
Decision 9: The Board of Directors decided to invest in offering free maintenance services to its
clients. They left it to their Chief Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in the business
activity. How much of the company’s money would you like to invest?
Outcome 9: ChipTech made a 6% profit on its investment by offering free maintenance services
to its clients.

In late 2001, another company started making attempts to forcibly take over ChipTech.
Crossroad 10: The Board of Directors had to decide how to deal with this attempt at hostile
takeover by its competitor.
Decision 10: The Board of Director decided to fight this takeover. They left it to their Chief
Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in fighting this takeover. How much of the
company’s money would you like to invest?
Outcome 10: ChipTech made a 2% loss on its investment to fight the takeover.
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It had been about a decade since the company was established. A lot of the equipment in
ChipTech’s production plant was old and outdated. This was slowing down the process of
building microchips as well as tracking clients, deliveries, and supplies.
Crossroad 11: The Board had to decide whether to update the existing equipment and software.
No one could be sure that it would actually help improve the process. New technology might
have its own problems. For instance, employees might not know how to use the new equipment
delaying the tracking of client, deliveries, and supplies.
Decision 11: The Board decided to update the existing equipment and software. They left it to
their Chief Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in the business activity. How much of
the company’s money would you like to invest?
Outcome 11: ChipTech made an 11% profit on its investment in updating equipment and
software

In early 2002, the government announced that it was looking for a new supplier of microchips
for its many programs and departments. ChipTech would have to compete with other firms to
win this contract.
Crossroad 12: The Board of Directors had to decide whether to compete for a government
contract. Competing for the government contract would mean moving talented managers and
engineers from development of microchips and customer service to work on this new project.
This could interfere with existing functions of the company.
Decision 12: The Board of Directors decided to compete for the government contract. They left
it to their Chief Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in the business activity. How
much of the company’s money would you like to invest?
Outcome 12: ChipTech made a 3% loss on its investment in competing for a government
contract.
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Crossroad 13: At the beginning of 2003, ChipTech had to decide whether to license its product.
The benefit of licensing would be that ChipTech would receive a substantial sum of money per
year for its product. At the same time they could protect their design by placing limits on the
other company’s ability to develop its own product. However, the downside was that it might
reveal the design of the microchips, which is a trade secret, to ChipTech’s competitors.
Decision 13: The Board of Directors decided to license its product. They left it to their Chief
Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in the business activity. How much of the
company’s money would you like to invest?
Outcome 13: ChipTech made a 4% profit on its investment by licensing its product.

Crossroad 14: In late 2003, ChipTech felt the need to diversify. The Board of Directors had to
decide whether to buy another company. One that looked especially attractive was TechOne,
which specialized in making water-resistant microchips. Water-resistant microchips are used in
machines that work deep under the water mapping ocean floors and sea-beds, studying sea
creatures and vegetation. There was no guarantee that buying TechOne would help ChipTech
make profits.
Decision 14: The Board of Directors decided to acquire the company specializing in waterresistant microchips. They left it to their Chief Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in
the business activity. How much of the company’s money would you like to invest?
Outcome 14: ChipTech made a 10% profit on its investment by buying TechOne.
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In 2004, ChipTech was sued by one of its clients for poor service.
Crossroad 15: The Board of Directors had to decide whether to fight the lawsuit. There was no
guarantee that they would win the lawsuit. If they lost they would have to pay the fees of the
lawyers, court fees and a large compensation to their client.
Decision 15: The Board of Directors decided to fight the lawsuit that they provided poor service.
They left it to their Chief Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in the business activity.
How much of the company’s money would you like to invest?
Outcome 15: ChipTech made a 4% profit on its investment by fighting the lawsuit.

In 2005, ChipTech started facing many issues with employee satisfaction. Employees were
demanding better pay and better working conditions. Employees were getting into arguments
with their co-workers. There was a general feeling that people weren’t been promoted fast
enough. Employees wanted more opportunities, for instance to improve their knowledge and
skills through traditional and online classes.
Crossroad 16: The Board of Directors had to decide whether to spend money on improving
employee satisfaction. However, even if they invested money into this, there was no guarantee it
would work. Employees might still feel dissatisfied with their work and co-workers.
Decision 16: The Board of Directors decided to invest money in improving employee
satisfaction. They left it to their Chief Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in the
business activity. How much of the company’s money would you like to invest?
Outcome 16: ChipTech made a 5% loss on its investment in programs trying to improve
employee satisfaction.
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By the end of 2006, trying to keep smart, talented employees became a struggle for ChipTech.
Employees started leaving ChipTech so they could go work for the competition.
Crossroad 17: The Board of Directors had to decide whether to put money into retaining their
employees. The company could provide longer leaves for new parents, flexible work hours, and
better health care to make ChipTech more attractive. Of course, there was no guarantee all these
perks would work and help keep employees.
Decision 17: The Board of Directors decided to invest money in trying to retain their employees.
They left it to their Chief Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in the business activity.
How much of the company’s money would you like to invest?
Outcome 17: ChipTech made a 4% loss on its investment on perks trying to retain employees.

One of ChipTech’s competitors, PrimaCorp, released a new line of microchips that were heat
resistant. ChipTech suspected that PrimaCorp had obtained the secret designs illegally.
Crossroad 18: The Board of Directors had to decide whether to take legal action against
PrimaCorp. There was no guarantee that ChipTech would win the fight.
Decision 18: The Board of Directors decided to sue PrimaCorp for violation of patent laws. They
left it to their Chief Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in the lawsuit. How much of
the company’s money would you like to invest?
Outcome 18: ChipTech made a 1% loss on its investment in the lawsuit again PrimaCorp.
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Crossroad 19: ChipTech had to decide whether to collaborate with private companies that were
building space shuttles like Tesla. There was no guarantee the company would make any profit.
Decision 19: The Board of Directors decided to invest in space technology. They left it to their
Chief Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in the business activity. How much of the
company’s money would you like to invest?
Outcome 19: ChipTech made a 9% profit on its investment.

Crossroad 20: In 2010, ChipTech had to decide whether to hire a famous actor to promote its
brand. The actor could use his or her celebrity status to promote the brand. The actor could wear
ChipTech t-shirts at award shows and tweet how awesome the product was. The celebrity could
also give away free stuff to his/her fans to promote ChipTech. However, there was no guarantee
it would work. .
Decision 20: The Board of Directors decided to hire a celebrity to act as their brand ambassador.
They left it to their Chief Financial Officer to decide how much to spend on hiring a celebrity.
How much of the company’s money would you like to invest?
Outcome 20: ChipTech made a 7% profit on its investment by hiring a famous actor to promote
their product.
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In 2011, ChipTech was threatened with legal action by the local community for dumping toxic
waste in nearby rivers. ChipTech challenged the evidence. It hired a public relations officer to
give interviews to the media denying the accusations. The company had to decide whether to go
to court.
Crossroad 21: The Board of Directors had to decide whether to fight the accusations of
environmental pollution in court. There was no guarantee ChipTech would win.
Decision 21: The Board of Directors decided to fight the lawsuit in the courts. They left it to
their Chief Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in the court battle. How much of the
company’s money would you like to invest?
Outcome 21: ChipTech made an 8% profit on its investment by fighting environmental pollution
accusations.

Crossroad 22: ChipTech had to decide whether to make another attempt to enter a foreign
market. This time it targeted South America. There was no guarantee that it would succeed in
finding consumers for their product.
Decision 22: The Board of Directors decided to partner with a local firm in South America that
was already manufacturing microchips for movie studios. They left it to their Chief Financial
Officer to decide how much to invest in the business activity. How much of the company’s
money would you like to invest?
Outcome 22: ChipTech made a 5% loss on its investment by attempting to enter into South
American markets.

By 2012, sales of microchips had been falling for some time. Because of which, ChipTech was
making fewer and fewer profits each year.
Crossroad 23: The Board of Directors had to decide whether to get a loan from an investment
bank to try to get over the bad phase. There was no guarantee a loan would help them get
through the decreasing profits.
Decision 23: The Board of Directors decided to acquire a loan from an investment bank. They
left it to their Chief Financial Officer to decide how much of the loan to invest in the business
activity. How much of the company’s money would you like to invest?
Outcome 23: ChipTech made an 8% profit on its investment by taking a loan from an
investment bank.
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By 2014, the competition between ChipTech and other microchip manufacturers was growing
intense. Microchips developed by other companies combined heat and water resistant
capabilities. Consumers did not want to spend on ChipTech’s product which provided heat and
water resistance separately. ChipTech was rapidly losing its share of the microchip market.
Crossroad 24: The Board of Directors had to decide whether to invest in making similar heatwater resistant microchips to get their clients back. There was no guarantee that they would be
able to invent such a microchip.
Decision 24: The Board of Directors decided to invest in developing similar microchips that had
both heat-water resistant capabilities. They left it to their Chief Financial Officer to decide how
much to invest in the business activity. How much of the company’s money would you like to
invest?
Outcome 24: ChipTech made a 2% loss on its investment in developing heat-water resistant
microchips.
By 2015, ChipTech had tried and failed to keep up with the technological advancement in the
microchip industry. They had to make one final attempt to save the company.
Crossroad 25: The Board of Directors had to decide whether to move the headquarters of
ChipTech to another country where it would not have to pay as many taxes. However, there was
no guarantee it would succeed.
Decision 25: The Board of Directors decided to move the headquarters of ChipTech to Ireland.
They left it to their Chief Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in the business activity.
How much of the company’s money would you like to invest?
Outcome 25: ChipTech made a 3% profit on its investment by moving its headquarters to
another country.
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No-Normalization of Deviance Condition
Around the same time, ChipTech also hired 20 new employees for its production plant. As per
the Human Resource policies, new employees had to go through the Standard Operating
Procedures training within a month of hire. The department in charge of producing these
microchips, however, felt that it would be impossible to set aside 20 employees for training and
meet the quarterly production goals at the same time. The company had already missed one
deadline. If the company did not meet the quarterly goals it would greatly reduce the profits. It
was a very stressful time for all the employees.
The Board of Directors called a meeting of the managers to discuss the problem. Most managers
reported that there had been no major accidents which according to them showed that the new
employees had learned the procedures on their own. Two managers, however, disagreed with
this assessment. The first manager said she had seen at least one new employee almost get hit by
a cargo truck most probably because he was unaware of the safety rules. The second manager
reported that he had also seen four or five new employees walking around the silicon processing
room without masks. These masks are mandatory in the room where silicon is processed to
prevent inhaling poisonous chemicals. He said he ordered the new employees to go to the health
care center immediately so the doctor could test them for dangerous chemicals.
Crossroad 2: The Board of Directors had to decide whether to delay training for the 20 new
employees. However, there was no guarantee that the decision to delay training would help the
company achieve its production goals.
Decision 2: Based on the discussion with managers the Board felt they had enough evidence that
the new employees had not gathered a basic understanding of the procedures on their own. They
decided not to delay training for the 20 new employees. They left it to their Chief Financial
Officer to decide how much to invest in the business activity. How much of the company’s
money would you like to invest?
Outcome 2: ChipTech made a 10% profit on its investment by not postponing training.
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In 1998, ChipTech expanded into making specialized heat-resistant microchips for companies
that often work deep inside the core of the earth like those that mine for metals. Heat-resistant
microchips are microchips that are expected to withstand heat from anywhere from 392o F to
482o F. Unfortunately, the company found that its microchips were overheating at much lower
temperatures. In fact, one batch of microchips exploded due to overheating injuring two
employees. The two employees had to be rushed to the emergency room after been badly burned
by these exploding microchips.
Crossroad 4: The Board of Directors had to decide whether to go ahead with mass production or
go back and redesign the chips. There was no guarantee that redesigning would prevent
overheating. The Board had a long discussion on how to deal with this issue. They took a closer
look at the evidence to see if it was serious.
Decision 4: The Board concluded that exploding microchips due to over-heating was a concern.
There was enough evidence to delay production. The Board of Directors decided to go back and
redesign microchips. They left it to their Chief Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in
the business activity. How much of the company’s money would you like to invest?
Outcome 4: ChipTech earned an 8% profit on its investment by delaying the production of
microchips and redesigning them.
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Appendix D
Practice Trial 1 Crossroad 1 Decision 1
Quench is a juice manufacturing company owned by Ms. Samantha Richardson, a third
generation juice manufacturer. The company was founded in 1948 by Ms. Richardson’s
grandfather. Ms. Richardson took over the company from her father in 1983. Quench
originally owned vineyards and produced only grape juice. However, during the late 1970s,
the money from grape juice production started decreasing. Times were tough. The company
was facing a lot of competition from soda manufacturers.
Practice Trial Crossroad 1: The Board of Directors had to decide whether to expand its
business into manufacturing other fruit juices besides grapes. However, there was no
guarantee that the plan would work. Consumers might not like the taste of the new fruit juices
and not buy the new products.
Practice Trial Decision 1: The Board of Directors decided to expand its business activity
into manufacturing other fruit juices. They left it to their Chief Financial Officer, that is you,
to decide how much to invest in the business activity. How much of the company’s money
would you like to invest?
Practice Trial Outcome 1: Quench made a 4% profit on its investment by expanding its fruit
juice line.
Practice Trial Crossroad 2: In 1980, the company had to decide whether to change its logo to
give it a younger, more modern look. This was not an easy decision. If the company changed its
logo, its long-time consumers might not recognize the product and Quench might lose
consumers. On the other hand if Quench did not change its logo, the product might look old and
outdated and fail to attract newer, younger consumers. Thus, there was no guarantee that
changing the logo would work.
Practice Trial Decision 2: The Board of Directors decided to change the company logo. They
left it to their Chief Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in the business activity. How
much of the company’s money would you like to invest?
Practice Trial Outcome 2: Quench made a 5% loss on its investment by changing its logo.
Practice Trial Crossroad 3: In 1990, there was a growing awareness among consumers about
artificial flavors and sweeteners in food products and its effects on health. Consumers had started
avoiding drinks with such ingredients. Quench had to decide whether to continue using artificial
ingredients in its fruit juices or to move in the direction of becoming more organic. There was no
guarantee that going organic would help them gain consumers or make profits.
Practice Trial Decision 3: The Board of Directors decided go organic. They left it to their Chief
Financial Officer to decide how much to invest in the business activity. How much of the
company’s money would you like to invest?
Practice Trial Outcome 3: Quench made a 2% profit on its investment by going organic.
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Appendix F
PIN: ____________________
Demographics Questionnaire
Sex:

Male

Female

Age: _______ years
Are you a U.S. Citizen:

Yes

No

Ethnicity:
African-American
_______
Caucasian, Non-Hispanic _______
Latino
_______
Native American Indian _______
Asian-American
_______
Other
_______
What language(s) do you speak?
English
_______
English and Spanish
_______
English and Other(s)
_______
Please indicate which other language(s): _______________
Which year are you in college?
Freshman
Sophomore
Senior

Junior

In the study that you just took part in, did any of the crossroads stand out for you? If yes,
please list all that apply and explain.
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________

In the study that you just took part in, did any of the decisions stand out for you? If yes,
please list all that apply and explain.
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
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In the study that you just took part in, did any of the outcomes stand out for you? If yes,
please list all that apply and explain.
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
What do you think the study was about?
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________

Are you currently employed?
______________________________________________________________________
What jobs have you held in the past?
______________________________________________________________________
Do you have insurance? If yes, list all that apply.
______________________________________________________________________
Do you have any loans? List all that apply.
______________________________________________________________________
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Appendix G
Instructions for Participants
“For this study you will be reading the case history of a real company and the decisions you will
be making are real ones that the company faced. During the trials, you will be playing the role of
the head of the financial department. Your job title is Chief Financial Officer. It is your job to
decide how much of the company’s money to invest into a business activity that the Board of
Directors has chosen. In other words, the Board of Directors will decide what business activity to
invest money in but it will be your job to decide how much money to invest into the business
activity. The company has a $100 million in its bank account at the start of the trial as
represented by the monopoly money here. You can invest anywhere between $1 million and the
total amount in the company’s account. You can only invest in whole numbers or round figures.
The amount will be noted on the excel file.
Let me take a moment to explain how the excel file is set up. Column A is where your PIN has
been entered. Column B is where the different rounds or the trials are listed. Column C is where
the amount you invest will be noted. Following this is column D where the percentage profit is
noted while in column E the actual amount of profit in dollars for each trial is noted. Column F is
where the percentage loss is noted while in column G the actual amount of loss in dollars for
each trial is noted.
Column H shows the amount that the company’s bank account holds at the start of the trial.
Column I shows the profits across different trials. Column J shows the losses across different
trials. Column K shows the company’s earnings across different trials. Column L shows the total
amount in the company’s bank account. Column M shows your income in quarters.
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You will pick a card from the top of the stack and read the card. On the card will be the
background information about the company, and the dilemma, called crossroad, facing the Board
of Directors. Also on the card will be the decision the Board of Directors made. Following this
you will be asked to decide the amount of money you would like to invest into the business
activity chosen by the Board of Directors. After this you will pick up another card from the stack
which will indicate what the outcome of the decision was. Some outcomes will make you profits
while others will make you losses. For every 10 million in monopoly money you earn for your
company, you will earn yourself a quarter in real money. For every 10 million in monopoly
money you lose the company you will lose a quarter in real money. For example, if you earn 50
million for the company you will earn yourself 5 quarters. If you lose the company 30 million
you will lose 3 quarters.
You are allowed to keep the quarters that you earn during the study when you leave the study.
You will be shown a total of 25 cards. After the 14th trial you can choose to stop at any time you
want. The goal is to make as much profit as you can for the company. The four participants who
make the most profit for the company will be awarded a $25 gift card. If there’s a tie, a lucky
draw will be used to decide the four people who receive the gift card.
Do you have any questions so far? [Answer the questions the participant asks. If they don’t have
any questions continue with the instructions.]
“Before we begin the actual trials, we will first do a practice round with three trials. You should
feel free to ask questions any time during the practice trials. [The RA will answer any questions
and clarify any doubts the participant might have.]
Once the practice trials are completed, the RA will start the main study.
“Shall we start the actual trials?”
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Instruction after the 14th trial
“You have reached the 14th trial. From here on you can choose to stop at any point. Would you
like to stop or would you like to continue?”
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Appendix H
Trials, Outcomes, Means and Standard Deviations for all 25 trials.
NOD (N= 88)

No-NOD (N = 83)

Trial No.

Outcome (%)

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

1

+3

21.27

21.944

19.81

19.175

2

+10

6.95

10.383

8.39

10.101

3

+2

16.60

17.462

18.45

19.438

4

+8

8.78

12.813

18.22

18.140

5

+4

16.72

17.680

15.81

19.260

6

+12

18.92

16.983

18.46

18.375

7

-6

17.67

20.327

16.63

21.240

8

+9

16.82

20.455

19.19

17.408

9

+6

16.16

14.381

19.35

20.406

10

-2

18.84

17.988

26.30

24.006

11

+11

30.03

24.210

32.42

24.492

12

-3

22.41

18.436

25.05

23.061

13

+4

22.13

19.209

26.58

23.220

14

+10

27.92

24.052

34.87

26.324

15

+4

8.39

12.934

9.10

11.890

16

-5

21.47

22.796

21.58

22.962

17

-4

18.18

22.156

20.31

20.450

18

-1

15.52

19.275

18.86

23.041
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NOD (N= 88)

No-NOD (N = 83)

19

+9

19.36

23.807

21.33

25.214

20

+7

17.24

26.996

17.05

20.793

21

+8

9.90

14.907

13.08

17.899

22

-5

16.69

20.997

18.80

22.411

23

+8

13.49

20.451

14.58

19.649

24

-2

24.35

27.729

25.92

25.555

25

+1

27.94

34.039

30.84

32.944
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Appendix I
Parameter Estimates for the Exploratory Models Examining the Relationship between Financial
Loans and Investment
Model A (Loans)
Fixed components
Intercept

00

12.367
t(199.963)=7.389
SE = 1.674
P < .001
CI: 9.067, 15.668

Linear
Time

10

0.791
t(870) =4.995
SE = 0.158
P < .001
CI: 0.480, 1.102

Quadratic time

20

-0.023
t(3933) = -4.687
SE = 0.005
P <.001
CI:-0.033, -0.014

Loan

01

3.815
t(171) = 2.363
SE = 1.614
P = .019
CI:0.628, 7.001

Loan *
Time_Lin

11

-0.073
t(171) = -0.706
SE = 0.104
P = .481
CI:-0.278, 0.132
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Model A (Loans)
Variance of random
components
Intercept
variance

00

Slope variance

11

Intercept*Slope
covariance

01

2

Deviance
(-2LL)

203.295
Wald Z = 7.897
SE = 1.289
p < .001
CI: 158.615,
260.562
0.806
Wald Z = 7.580
SE = 0.106
p < .001
CI: 0.623, 1.044
-4.927
Wald Z = -3.824
SE = 1.289
p < .001
CI:-7.452, -2.401
229.644
Wald Z = 44.345
SE = 5.179
p < .001
CI: -7.452, -2.401
36182.261
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Appendix J
Model for Examining the Relationship between Dark Triad Traits and Investment
Model B
Three Level-2
Predictor
(Mach, Narc &
Psypath)
Fixed
components
Intercept

00

14.720
t(171.307) = .959
SE =15.347
CI: -15.572, 45.013
p = 0.339

Linear
Time

10

0.355
t(176.222) = 0.362
SE = 0.981
CI: -1.581, .292
p = 0.718

Quadratic
time

20

-0.023***
t(3933) = -4.687
SE = 0.005
CI: -0.033, -0.014

MACH

01

0.255
t(171) =0.898
SE = 0.285
CI: -0.306, 0.817
p = .371

PSYPATH

02

-0.199
t(171) =-0.483
SE = 0.413
CI: -1.014, 0.616
p = 0.630
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NARC

NOD *
Time_Lin
MACH*
Time_Lin

11

-0.150
t(171) = -0.385
SE = 0.390
CI: -0.921, 0.620
p = 0.701
-

11

0.013

03

t(171) = 0.706
SE = 0.018
CI: -0.023, 0.048
p =0.481
PSYPATH
*
Time_Lin

NARC*
Time_Lin

12

-0.004
t(171) = -0.157
SE = 0.026
CI: -0.056, 0.048
p = 0.876

13

0.003
t(171) =0.130
SE = 0.025
CI: -0.046, 0.052
p = 0.897

Variance of
random
components
Intercept
variance

00

209.212***
Wald Z = 7.930
SE = 26.383
CI: 163.399, 267.869

Slope
variance

Intercept
*Slope
covarianc
e

11

0.806***

01

Wald Z = 7.579
SE = 0.106
CI: 0.622, 1.044
-5.142***
Wald Z = -3.930
SE = 1.308
86

2

Deviance
(-2LL)

Deviance

CI:-7.707, -2.578
229.644***
Wald Z = 44.345
SE = 5.179
CI: 219.715, 240.021
35852.713
Model 2-Model B
χ2 (6) =335.223*

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Appendix K
Piecewise Growth
MODEL: I S1 | PTRSKD4@0 PTRSKD5@1 PTRSKD6@1 PTRSKD7@1;
I S2 | PTRSKD4@0 PTRSKD5@0 PTRSKD6@1 PTRSKD7@1;
I S3 | PTRSKD4@0 PTRSKD5@0 PTRSKD6@0 PTRSKD7@1;

I S1 ON CDTQTT CMach CPsych CNarc;
I S2 ON CDTQTT CMach CPsych CNarc;
I S3 ON CDTQTT CMach CPsych CNarc;
PTRSKD4@0 PTRSKD5@0 PTRSKD6@0 PTRSKD7@0;
I

ON
CDTQTT

-9.539

2.253

-4.233

0.000

CMACH

0.195

0.267

0.732

0.464

CPSYCH

-0.301

0.387

-0.779

0.436

CNARC

-0.432

0.366

-1.181

0.238

S1

ON

CDTQTT

10.211

2.428

4.206

0.000

CMACH

-0.052

0.288

-0.180

0.857

CPSYCH

0.052

0.417

0.124

0.901

CNARC

-0.126

0.394

-0.319

0.750

S2

ON
88

CDTQTT

-0.263

2.451

-0.107

0.914

CMACH

-0.150

0.290

-0.516

0.606

CPSYCH

0.268

0.421

0.637

0.524

CNARC

0.214

0.398

0.537

0.592

CDTQTT

0.259

2.916

0.089

0.929

CMACH

0.475

0.345

1.375

0.169

CPSYCH

-0.232

0.500

-0.464

0.643

CNARC

0.283

0.474

0.596

S3

S1
I

S2

ON

WITH
-86.154

-15.489

S1

-122.696

I

18.805

-4.581

0.000

17.820

-0.869

0.385

WITH

I

S3

0.551

21.332

-5.752

0.000

WITH
43.431

S1

18.281

S2

-212.930

21.413
22.835
28.187

2.028
0.801
-7.554

0.043
0.423
0.000
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Intercepts
PTRSKD4

0.000

0.000

999.000

999.000

PTRSKD5

0.000

0.000

999.000

999.000

PTRSKD6

0.000

0.000

999.000

999.000

PTRSKD7

0.000

0.000

999.000

999.000

I

17.863

1.611

11.089

0.000

S1

-2.646

1.736

-1.524

0.127

S2

2.378

1.752

1.357

0.175

S3

-2.237

2.084

-1.073

0.283

Residual Variances
PTRSKD4

0.000

0.000

999.000

999.000

PTRSKD5

0.000

0.000

999.000

999.000

PTRSKD6

0.000

0.000

999.000

999.000

PTRSKD7

0.000

0.000

999.000

999.000

I

213.767

23.118

9.247

0.000

S1

248.163

26.838

9.247

0.000

S2

252.888

27.349

9.247

0.000

S3

357.946

38.711

9.247

0.000
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Appendix L
Mean, SD and Range for the Dark Triad
Mean

SD

Range

Machiavellianism

27.66

5.29

11 to 42

Psychopathy

13.47

3.53

6 to 24

Narcissism

27.59

3.42

16 to 32
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Appendix M
Study Two
The current study can be looked at as a first of a series of studies that examines the
construct of normalization of deviance. Study two could specifically focus on unpacking step
three of NOD or the reassessment of risk stage. More specifically, this study could take a closer
look at the various social and psychological process that influence risk assessment and therefore
influence behavior. Unlike the current study where participants were experienced only two
exposures of NOD, the second study should consider exposing participants to multiple exposures
of NOD which are in the order of increasing strength. The study could be designed as a cross
between psychological forces such as social norms (e.g., the “Bystander Effect”; Darley &
Latané, 1968) or obedience to authority (e.g., Milgram, 1963). From the former study we might
borrow the aspect of vague nature of emergency and the participants’ failure to extend help while
from the latter study we might borrow the aspect of incremental increase of stimuli. Study two
design could involve a vague signal of risk, and due to the reassessment of that risk, the
participant may make no attempt to reduce the risk. The signal of risk would increase
incrementally at each trial and at each trial the participant continues to make no attempt to reduce
the risk. In other words, exposed to increasing risk the participant responds with inaction.
The second study should also consider reducing the number of trials from 25 to 7 (or 10).
The trials could be reduced using the feedback received from the participants of the current
study. Having fewer trials would make the increase in signal of risk both practically easy to
accomplish for the experimenter and plausible for the participants to buy into. The outcome of
the trials should be restricted to positive or favorable to the participant. The current experiment
has shown that NOD participants respond differently to a negative outcome (or loss) and this
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might be the reason for losing the effect. Hence restricting the outcome to a positive ones would
help sustain the effect of NOD.
The second study can be designed as a financial decision study or a non-financial
decision study. If it is designed as a financial decision study, the invested amount should be
between 1 million and 5, 7 or 10 million which will reflect a regular Likert-type scale, instead of
1 to 100 as was in the current study. This reduction in amount would make things easier for
participants to grasp. Most importantly, the dependent variable should not be the amount
invested since it might not be an accurate measure of risk seeking behavior. For example,
suppose two participants on trial 4 invested 4 million. However, participant one had 5 million at
hand while participant two had 10 million. Participant one is clearly the more risk seeking of the
two for investing 80% of his money while participant two invested only 40% of his. Thus,
perhaps a more sensitive dependent variable should be the percentage of the amount risked,
which is the percentage of amount invested out of the amount at hand. For example if the
participant had 5 million at hand and invested 2 million, percentage risked = (100x2)/ 5 = 40%.
In terms of covariates, the study should consider measuring both time invariant covariates like
the current study as well as time varying covariates. Important time invariant covariates or
participant level covariates that could be measured are personality traits like financial risk
seeking, optimism. Important time variant covariates or trial level covariates that could be
measured are optimism at each trial, riskiness of each decision.
If the study is designed as a more behavioral study the researcher could use a confederate
to manipulate the reassessment of risk. The decision game could be played in pairs where one
person in the pair is a participant while the other is a confederate. Study two could explore which
one of the two competing explanations might be involved in the reassessment of risk - risk as a
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rational mathematical calculation or risk a subjective emotional experience (Slovic, Finucane,
Peters, E., & MacGregor, 2004; Dillon & Tinsley, 2008). Also, the current study tested only a
component of NOD. Since NOD can be both the cause and the effect future studies should
examine this further and tease those two things apart. Finally, the results of the study could be
analyzed using a structural equations modeling (SEM) framework or a multi-level structural
equations modeling (ML-SEM) framework.
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